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WORLD ORDER will be secured only when the whole world has laid down these weapons which seem to offer us present security but 
threaten the future survival of the human race. That armistice day 
seems very far away. The vast resources of this planet are being de-
voted more and more to the means of destroying, instead of enriching, 
human life. 
But the world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits 
his execution. Nor has mankind survived the tests and trials of 
thousands of years to surrender everything-including its existence-
now. This Nation has the will and the faith to make a supreme effort 
to break the logjam on disarmament and nuclear tests, -and we will 
persist until we prevail, until the rule of law has replaced the ever 
dangerous use of force. 
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY 
State of the Union Message 
January 11, 196B 
Contents 
TOW ARD A WORLD WITHOUT WAR 
iv 
Earlier Disarmament Efforts . . 
The Search for a New Approach 
Arms Control Concept 
U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Disarmament Principles. 
Economic Consequences of Disarmament Appraised 
The Concept of the U.S. Plan ...... . 
Elements of the New U.S. Disarmament Plan 
Highlights of the U.S. Disarmament Plan. 
Verifying Disarmament Progress 
Conclusion 
Page 
1 
5 
7 
9 
10 
11 
12 
15 
19 
26 
28 
Toward a World Without War 
There is a thread which runs with tragic regularity throughout the 
recorded history of man; it is the thread of war and bloodshed between 
peoples and nations. Can it be stopped ? No one knows. Yet, if ever 
there was an opportune time and a bUTIling need, this is the moment. 
Never before has man come closer to harnessing nature's immense 
resources for the well-being of the great masses of the earth's popula-
tion; and never before has he been so ingenious in devising techniques 
for their total annihilation. It is in his power to take one road or the 
other toward the world of health and plenty which the advances in 
modern science and technology increasingly make possible, or toward 
the radioactive wasteland which is equally within the capacity of 
modern technology. 
Ours is a time of great revolutionary changes-political, social, 
economic-utterly unimaginable a century ago. The present U.S. 
effort to reach agreement on disarmament springs from th~ conviction 
that 20th-century man can bring about still another great revolution 
in the history of man-universal disarmament. This revolution, if it 
comes, will not merely fulfill the ancestral dream of freeing man from 
the destruction of war, but by liberating enormous resources and en-
ergies it will profoundly affect all the other revolutionary trends of 
our times and adv-ance the day when man becomes truly the master 
of his destiny. 
The current search for disarmament is spurred by this vision. At 
the same time, there are practical factors that make disarmament a 
realistic possibility. One is the existence of a vital organization for 
international cooperation-the United Nations. Another is our 
greater knowledge and understanding of the problem because of 
intensive and pathbreaking studies made in recent years. But per-
haps the most important incentive for a disarmament agreement is the 
increased awareness by all nations of the great perils inherent in the 
present world situation. 
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What are these perils ~ 
First of all, there is the danger of nuclear war-a specter which 
hangs over all humanity. Its awesome reality lends an unprecedented 
urgency to the present quest. "The weapons of war must be abolished 
before they abolish us," said President I{ennedy last year in his ad-
dress to the U.N. General Assembly. "The mere existence of modern 
weapons--ten million times more powerful than anything the world 
has ever seen, and only minutes away from any target on earth-is a 
source of horror and discord and distrust." In these circumstances, 
he went on to say, the reduction and destruction of arms "is no longer 
a dream; it is a practical matter of life or death." 
Another peril in the present state of affairs is the terrible cost, in 
human terms, of the arms race. The U.S. gross national product in 
1961-that is the value of all the goods and services produced in the 
country-was over $521 billion. The United States spends roughly 
10 percent of this amount on national defense. The burden is even 
heavier for other countries where the gross national product is smaller 
and the standard of living lower. 
At the same time the complex weapons which make up the modern 
arsenal of nations require ever larger resources. The C()st of produc-
ing a submarine in World War II, for example, was about $8 million. 
This type of vessel is now so completely outmoded that it cannot even 
be compared to a modern nuclear-powered, missile-equipped sub-
marine such as the Polaris type. The Polaris-type U.S. submarine, 
without its missiles, costs about $110 million. 
Naturally, as long as there is no general agreement on disarma-
ment among nations each country will go on spending whatever it 
deems necessary to protect its national security and deter a would-be 
aggressor. Since the cost of modern weapons keeps mounting, this 
spending requires a constantly greater sacrifice of national resources 
and living standards. 
Nevertheless, objectively considered, the policy of deterrence has 
helped to preserve peace during a time of great international tension. 
President Kennedy, like his predecessors, has made it clear that the 
United States maintains its military strength precisely .for the purpose 
of minimizing the chance that it will ever have to be used. Other 
countries have made similar declarations. The reluctance of any na-
tion to risk a major nuclear conflict has played an important role in 
averting war during the years since the end of World War II. 
At the same time it is clear that nuclear deterrence-the universal 
fear of nuclear war-is only a temporary "second-best" to disarma-
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The Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament opens at Geneva on 
March 14, 1962. 
ment. It carries no guarantee against the outbreak of war. All it 
does is buy time-precious time in which to find an agreement on 
disarmament. 
The unstable character of deterrence, therefore, represents the 
third major peril in continuing the present arms race. Thus far two 
nations-the United States and the U.S.S.R.-have acquired the de-
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structive power to lay waste to much of the world. As more nations 
acquire this power, as the arsenals continue to grow and expand-and 
they must unless the arms race is stopped-the risks of war c.ontinue 
t.o multiply. 
But the world is not helpless in the face of these dangers. The 
postwar period has seen an unprecedented expansion of constructive 
international activities and a growing recognition that nations have 
responsibilities toward the international community. Aided also by 
numerous studies of the disarmament problem and by new scientific 
discoveries and techniques, the nations .of the world are now better 
equipped to solve the disarmament problem than ever before. 
It was with a profound conviction. .of the urgency and practica-
bility .of a disarmament agreement that the United States .on April 
18, 1962, submitted for consideration by the 18-N ati.on C.ommittee 
.on Disarmament at Geneva an "Outline of Basic Provisions .of a 
Treaty .on General and C.omplete Disarmament in a Peaceful World." 
This document is both far-reaching and realistic. T.o understand its 
sc.ope and appreciate its realism, a brief review .of earlier postwar 
efforts on disarmament is necessary. 
Combat aircraft which was resmelted to salvage aluminum and steel for peacetime 
use after W orld War II. 
BtJrnard Baruch presents to the United Nations the U.s. proposal for nuclear dis-
armament in 1946. 
Earlier Disarmament Efforts 
With the end of World War II, a number of countries took con-
crete action to reduce their armaments. The most drastic arms re-
duction was that of the United States, which destroyed thousands of 
aircraft and sent scores of warships and immense quantities of tanks 
and other equipment to the scrapyards. In addition, the United 
States reduced its Armed Forces from over 12 million to less than 2 
million in the short span of 3 years. This was typical of the volun-
tary disarmament by a few, done without an international treaty 
guaranteeing that all countries were doing the saIne. The world 
later found that this type of disarmament made no contribution to 
lasting peace. A careful, detailed, practical plan 'vas needed-espe-
cially to solve the problem of control of the atomic bomb. 
During early 1946, the United States was developing such a con· 
crete plan for nuclear disarmament. Often referred to as the "Ba-
5 
6611650-62--2 
ruch plan," it was submitted to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission 
in June 1946. It proposed the establishment of an International 
Atomic Development Authority. The functions of the Authority 
would have included: 
• Control or ownership of all atomic energy activities poten-
tially dangerous to world security. 
• Control, inspection, and licensing of all other atomic activities. 
• Fostering of the beneficial uses of atomic energy. 
• Research and development designed to put the International 
Authority in the forefront of atomic know ledge. 
• Power to control nuclear raw materials and nuclear produc-
tion plants. 
At this time, in 1946, the United States alone possessed atomic 
weapons. If the Baruch plan had been accepted, all these weapons 
would have been destroyed, further manufacture of atomic weapons 
would have stopped, and nuclear material adaptable for peaceful 
uses transferred to the International Authority. The nuclear threat 
would have been removed at the very outset, and mankind would have 
entered the nuclear age in a joint and peaceful effort. 
On December 30, 1946, the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission ap-
proved the Baruch plan by a vote of 10 to 0, with the U.S.S.R. and 
Poland abstaining; on September 11, 1947, the Commission reaffirmed 
its approval by a 10 to 1 vote, with the U.S.S.R. voting against and 
Poland abstaining; on November 4, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly 
endorsed it by a vote of 40 to 6. On each occasion the Soviet Gov-
ernment rejected the plan on the grounds that it would foster espio-
nage and constitute interference in internal affairs. 
Rebuffed by Soviet opposition to the Baruch plan, the United 
States, sometimes in association with other countries, presented a 
number of other proposals for disarmament or related actions. 
Among these were plans for reducing armed forces to 2.5 million 
men each for the United States and the U.S.S.R., transferring nuclear 
armaments to internationally supervised storage depots, stopping 
nuclear weapons tests under international control, stopping produc-
tion of fissionable materials usable for weapons purposes, transferring 
fissionable materials stockpiles from military to nonmilitary purposes, 
and establishing aerial and ground observation procedures in the 
United States, the U.S.S.R., and elsewhere to guard against sur-
prise attack. 
Soviet rejection of these measures was usually based on the claim 
that the inspection and control proposals accon1panying these plans 
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President Kennedy signs the bill establishing the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. William C. Foster (far right) is the Director of the new 
agency. 
were a pretense for espionage, and that disarmament should commence 
regardless of the efficacy of the verification mechanisn1. The United 
States pointed out that its inspection and ,control proposals would ap-
ply to all nations equally, and that in its view Soviet proposals 
lacked the necessary safeguards to insure that disarmament agree-
ments were actually carried out. 
One important achievement in the long years of discussion was 
the Atoms-for-Peace plan presented in 1953 by President Eisenhower. 
TIns led after years of negotiations to the establishment, in 1957, of 
an International Atomic Energy Agency. 
The Search for a New Approach 
All through the decade of the 1950's the deadlock on the crucial 
questions of nuclear disarmament and reliable verification co@inued. 
However, nuclear weapons testing was halted in 1958, when the 
United States, U.S.S.R., and Great Britain each unilaterally ac-
cepted a voluntary moratorium on tests. Negotiations for a treaty 
banning tests permanently, under international inspection, also showed 
promIse. But in August 1961 the U.S.S.R. announced it would resume 
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testino-, and meaningful progress on a test ban agreement suffered a 
severe setback. 
The failure t.o stop nuclear weapons tests lent even greater 
urgency to new efforts to reach agreement on the broader question of 
disarmament. Indeed only a month after the Soviet announcement, 
President Kennedy in September 1961 presented to the U.N. General 
Assembly the broad outlines of a new comprehensive U.S. disarma-
ment plan. This plan is based not only on the best parts of earlier 
proposals and studies but also on a fresh reappraisal of the whole 
problem made after President Kennedy took office in January 1961. 
The systematic review of the disarmament question was given 
added impetus by the establishment in 1961 of the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. This Agency combines activities pre-
viously carried on in several different departments and has specific 
responsibility for developing new approaches to disarmament and 
related problems. As the first governmental body anywhere to con-
centrate exclusively on such questions, the Disarmament Agency has 
brought together a highly qualified staff of experts in science, inter-
national relations, economics, and weapons systems. The work of 
these men and women also benefits from the many private studies and 
investigations which have been undertaken at U.S. universities and 
research institutes during the past decade. Never before have so 
much effort and so many resources been devoted to finding ways of 
stopping the arms race and building a secure peace. 
American scholars have been interested in disarmament for more 
than half a century, but their intensive efforts started toward the end 
of World War II with a serious exploration of ways to control the 
atomic bomb. A distinguished group of scholars, scientists, and Gov-
ernment officials headed by David Lilienthal, the former head of the 
Tennessee Valley public power and reclamation project, labored for 
months to master the complex technical problems of the bomb and 
set the studious pattern for all later efforts. This group's report was 
the basis of the Baruch plan for international ownership of all atomic 
facilities. 
During the 1940's and 1950's articles and books on disarmament 
multiplied in the United States. Institutes were established, and 
groups of scholars from different fields conducted broad investigations 
of the problem. In 1960 appeared a special 1,000-page issue of 
Daedalus, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
devoted entirely to articles on arms control and disarmament. The 
foreword was written by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, a leading physicist 
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with a long-standing interest in disarman1ent and now Special Assist-
ant to President Kennedy for Science and Technology. A listing of 
the 23 contributors to the volume reveals the broad variety of author-
ship: three physicists, two chemists, two economists, two legal scholars, 
one legislator, two political scientists, one military scientist, one 
psychologist, two journalists, two international relations experts, two 
mathematicians, and one diplomat. 
One of the legal scholars was Professor Louis Sohn of the 
Harvard Law School, who originated the idea of "zonal inspection," 
which has been suggested in the U.S. disarmament plan as a possible 
method of verification. 
Arms Control Concept 
This intensive scholarly activity developed the "arms control" 
concept, which has become an important element in American think-
ing. The idea started with the realization that everyone's agreed 
goal-abolishing war-cannot be reached solely through arms reduc-
tion plans, especially since such plans seem to take so long to be agreed 
upon and adopted. As complex modern weapons pile up, American 
intellectuals argued, risks of war through accident or miscalculation 
increase. Arms reduction-classic "disarmament"-is simply not 
enough. It is equally important that the major powers do something 
nOlO to cut the risk of war, while at the same time working for agree-
ment on arms reduction plans. 
So the concept of "arms control "-controlling, in the sense of 
calming, the military situation-was evolved. Arms control means 
measures, other than arms reduction itself, which lessen the risk of 
war. 
"Arms control" is a twin to "arms reduction"--not a substitute 
for it. Arms control measures are not intended to replace arms 
reductions but to accompany them. 
But discussions of disarmament in the United States have not 
been confined to the scholars. Public discussions, which are occurring 
with increasing frequency, have involved representatives from labor, 
business, the professions, and Government, as well as the universities. 
A number of private organizations have boon formed, with varying 
programs, devoted to the problems of peace and disarmament. 
At the United Nations, too, an atmosphere of urgency developed, 
and, with the active encouragement of the 15th U.N. General Assembly, 
U.S. and Soviet representatives in private meetings from March to 
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September 1961 explored the basis for a new and earnest effort toward 
disarmament. 
Out of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. discussions came the present 18-nation 
Geneva conference on disarmament--the most important international 
meeting on this question in many years. Eight new nations, repre-
senting different areas of the world, were added to the five Western 
and five Communist nations which had taken part in the previous 
negotiations. The new participants are: for Asia-India and Burma; 
for the Middle East-United Arab Republic; for Africa-Nigeria 
and Ethiopia; for Latin America-Mexico and Brazil; for Europe-
Sweden. 
Developments in the past year indicate that the long postwar years 
of negotiations and study have not been entirely fnlitless. Despite 
much disappointment and frustration the countries concerned now 
ha ve a better understanding of the problems that have hindered 
agreement on disarmament. There has emerged the realization that 
disarmament is a practical and attainable goal, not a Utopian dream; 
that it can begin even in the absence of mutual trust and confidence if 
verification procedures are adequate; and that it represents a highly 
complex technical, political, economic, and psychological process, 
which needs careful and continuous planning to succeed. 
Three recent developments reflect this realistic and hopeful 
approach to the problem: (1) the U.S.-U.S.S.R. ,Toint Statement of 
Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of September 20, 
1961; (2) the U.N. study "Economic and Social Consequences of Dis-
armament" of April 1962; and (3) the U.S. "Outline of Basic Pro-
visions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in. a 
Peaceful World,"-the most detailed and comprehensive proposal 
so far presented. 
U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Disarmament Principles 
The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles records agree-
nlent on a number of key issues. It states, among other things, that 
n1easures for general and complete disarmament-the goal of both 
nations-m tlst include: 
(1) " ... establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful 
settlement of disputes . . . [and] to strengthen institutions for main-
taining peace." 
(2) " ... agreed manpower for a United Nations peace 
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force . . . [to] deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation 
of the purposes and principles of the United Nations." 
(3) ". . . disarmament . . . in an agreed sequence, by stages . . . 
[and] balanced so that at no stage ... could any State ... gain 
military advantage." 
( 4) " . . . strict and effective international control . . . [to] 
provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obliga-
tions . . . the nature and extent of such control depending on the 
requirements for verification ... in each stage." 
( 5) ". . . an International Disarmament Organization . . . as-
sured [of] unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary 
for the purpose of effective verification." 
The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Agreed Principles was 
unanimously adopted as a United Nations resolution on December 20, 
1961. Thus these became United Nations principles, furnishing a 
world charter for all disarmament negotiations, including the 18-
nation conference at Geneva, which opened in March 1962. 
The significance of these principles cannot be overestimated, for 
if properly applied, they contain all the elements for an effective dis-
armament agreement and the building of a stable peace. They recog-
nize that war and the threat of war can be eliminated only if there 
are effective alternatives for settling disputes among nations· that 
disarmament cannot be achieved overnight but must progress through 
stages, creating, as it progresses, an atmosphere of mutual confidence· 
and lastly that effective international inspection is a legitimate and 
essential element of any disarmament program. 
Economic Consequences of Disarmament Appraised 
The U.N. study '~Economic and Social Consequences of Disarma-
Inent" represents a milestone of a different sort in the quest for a 
disarn1ament agreement. For the first time in the many years of dis-
cussion of the problem, an international group of experts has objec-
tively and scientifically evaluated the prospects and consequences of a 
disarmament agreement in economic and social terms. The group, ap-
pointed by the U.N. Secretary-General, included experts from the 
U.S.S.R., United States, United I{ingdom, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
France, Sudan, India, Pakistan, and Venezuela. These distinguished 
scholars examined all the available evidence on the problem, includ-
ing detailed studies by a number of governments undertaken in re-
11 
sponse to the Secretary-General's inquiry, and studies by specialized 
agencies of the United Nations. 
The group unanimously agreed that, contrary to some popular 
misconceptions, disarmament would not bring about an economic 
depression or large-scale unemployment, if governments took proper 
preventive measures. "All the problems and difficulties of transition 
connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national 
and international measures," the report states. "There should thus 
be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources 
now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all coun-
tries .... No country need fear a lack of useful employment oppor-
tunities for the resources that would become available to it through 
disarmament. " 
The experts examined in detail how the vast resources freed by 
disarmament might best be utilized. "There are so many competing 
claims," they concluded, "that the real problem is to establish a scale 
of priorities." The experts' report went on to list these possibilities: 
increased personal consumption; conversion of plants producing mil-
itary equipment to production of durable consumer goods; expansion 
of productive capacities needed for greater consumption; more invest-
ment in social improvements such as schools, housing, and hospitals; 
scientific research in hitherto neglected fields; international ventures 
for peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy; space research; explora-
tion of the Arctic and Antarctic; climate control; and othe~s. 
The U.S. cont.ribution to the U.N. study went into considerable 
detail concerning the impact disarmament would have on the Amer-
ican economy. It found that the U.S. economy would benefit greatly 
from disarmament and that any temporary dislocations could be sat-
isfactorily overcome by cooperative efforts of Government, business, 
and labor. It foresaw opportunities for a substantial increase in the 
American people's standard of living and ability to aid other nations 
as a result of the diversion of defense expenditures to consumer needs 
and socially beneficial projects. 
The Concept of the U.S. Plan 
But before the economic and social benefits of disarmament can 
be enjoyed, agreement on a disarmament plan is necessary. The 
United States believes it has a proposal that can be put into effect 
quickly, that meets the objections made to earlier plans and satisfies 
the security needs of all participating nations. 
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The new U.S. "Outline of a Treaty for General and Complete 
Disarmament in a Peaceful World" is wholly in accord with the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles. First outlined by Pres-
ident Kennedy in his address to the U.N. General Assembly in Sep-
tember 1961, it was fully developed by the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament would free vast resources for peaceful uses such as the building of 
new schools. 
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Disarmament Agency and then submitted for consideration by the 
18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva on April 18, 1962. 
The new U.S. plan represents a "total approach" to solving the 
problem of war on our planet. It starts from the premise that the 
main objective is not the destruction of arms-important as this is-
but the elimination of war and the building of a secure and lasting 
peace. Hence arms reduction-disarmament in the classic senser-is 
not treated in isolation but is made part and parcel of two other 
equally important elements of the peacebuilding process: (1) meas-
ures to enable the United Nations to become an effective agency for 
keeping the peace in a disarmed world and (2) steps to reduce the 
risks of war through accident or miscalculation. 
Many earlier disarmament efforts had foundered because they 
approached arms reduction as a goal in itself, without sufficient regard 
for the political conditions which cause international tensions. One 
of the few "successful" disarmament efforts of the past, the Washing-
ton Naval Conference of 1922, for example, resulted in an agreement 
by France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and the United States to reduce 
their respective fleets of battleships to a fixed level.' Yet this agree-
ment, while temporarily halting a naval race in battleships, had no 
The Washington Naval Conference of 1922 succeeded in temporarily halting a naval 
race in battleships. 
lasting benefit for international peace, because it was unrelated to 
effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures. 
In the light of such experiences and of postwar international 
developments, the United States proposes a realistic, not a Utopian, 
plan. It does not assume that disputes and distrust among nations 
will vanish with a stroke of a pen on a disarmament treaty; nor does 
it pretend that disarmament can be achieved overnight or apart from 
effective international measures to safeguard the security of nations. 
Yet, if accepted, this plan could transform our world within a short 
span of years into a secure and peaceful planet. 
Despite the complexity of the problem, the technique of the U. S. 
plan is basically simple. It is to stop the present arms race and 
start the world immediately on the path toward a secure world with-
out arms. As Ambassador Arthur Dean, the U.S. delegate, put it 
when he presented the plan to the IS-Nation Disarmament Confer-
ence, the idea is "that the nations of the world should ~eize a moment 
in time to stop the arms race, to freeze the military situation as it 
then appears, and to shrink it to zero ... like a balloon-instead 
of permitting more and more air to be blown into the balloon until 
it bursts, the air is let out of the balloon, and the balloon shrinks in 
simple proportion until the air is all gone." 
Elements of the New U.S. Disarmament Plan 
The U.S. proposal divides the process of disarmament into three 
stages-the first two to be carried out in estimated 3-year periods 
and the last stage as promptly as possible thereafter. In order to 
make speedy progress possible, Stage I can begin immediately after 
the treaty is ratified by the U.S.S.R., the United States, and such 
other countries as may be agreed on. Stage II would go into effect 
after the measures in Stage I have been implemented and verified, 
when preparations for Stage II are complete, and "all militarily sig-
nificant states" have joined the treaty. Stage III would comn1ence at 
the completion of Stage II and after all states possessing armed forces 
and armaments have become parties to the treaty. This staged proc-
ess is intended to protect the security interests of all participants by 
assuring them that they will not be disarming in good faith while 
others lag behind or remain outside the agreement. 
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Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, US. delegate to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarma-
ment, who has also represented the United States during disarmament debates at 
the United Nations. 
The U.S. plan is based on the following elements: 
1. Arms Reduction. The dismantling of the military establish-
ments of nations begins immediately in Stage I and continues until 
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completed in Stage III. The process of dismantling is designed to 
reduce as speedily as practicable the capacity of nations for waging 
war with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction or with major 
conventional weapons. The steps for reducing the military potential 
extend equally to all participating nations and are so organized that 
they do not change the relative military strength of the participants 
during the disarmament process. Thus nations can proceed to disarm 
without fear that their relative position vis-a-vis other nations may 
be altered to their disadvantage. The U.S. plan provides for slash-
ing the nuclear warmaking capacity of nations by 65 percent during 
the first two stages-estimated 6 years-of the treaty, and eliminat-
ing it entirely in the final stage. 
2. Verification. Effective verification by 'an international 
agency to make sure that nations are carrying out their obligations 
is essential. In the present world atmosphere of mutual distrust and 
suspicion it represents the only sound guarantee nations can accept 
for disarming. Without such effective safeguards no nation can be 
certain that its national security is not being jeopardized by some 
unscrupulous country bent on war or conquest. Soviet Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko stated at Geneva on March 19, 1962: 
"The Soviet Union wishes to have the necessary guarantees that 
t.he disarmament obligations that ha ve been agreed upon will be 
strictly carried out and that there are no loopholes which will permit 
the clandestine production of aggressive armaments once the process 
of general and complete disarmament has begun. 
"Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word, least 
of all States which have established closed military alignments, are 
pursuing a policy of building up armaments and have placed their 
military bases as close as possible to the Soviet Union. Nor do we 
expect others to take us at our word." 
The U.S. proposals for verification by an International Disarma-
ment Organization (IDO) are consistent with Mr. Gromyko's analysis 
of the problem. They call for strict but not excessive verification-
the precise amount depending on the specific djsarmament measure 
being considered. The simpler and more limited any specific step, 
the simpler and more limited the verification procedure suggested. 
Complex disarmament steps, however, might require more com-
prehensive verification procedures. Thus, a ban on production of 
fissionable materials which could be used to produce nuclear weapons 
might require disclosure of the location of all production facilities, 
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inspection by IDO, and some check that production is not continuing 
clandestinely in secret facilities. Reduction of existing stockpiles 
of such materials, on the other hand, is a far simpler measure to 
verify. It would require IDO simply to supervise the destruction or 
transfer to peaceful purposes of a specific quantity of fissionable 
material. 
In a further attempt to comply with the notion that the amount of 
inspection should be commensurate with the amount of disarmament 
undertaken, the U.S. plan suggests a system of progressive zonal 
inspection. Under this system countries would divide themselves into 
zones and list the military facilities or activities contained therein 
which are subject to verification, but not initially their precise loca-
tion. Actual disclosure of location and inspection would proceed 
step-by-step, by opening one zone after another as disarmament 
progresses. By the end of Stage III, verification would extend to 
the entire territory of countries. 
Under the U.S. plan, an International Disarmament Organization 
would be established within the framework of the United Nations. 
Its staff would be international, and its verification procedures would 
apply equally to all parties to the treaty. Thus it would be almost 
impossible for any country to gain an advantage over another by con-
trolling or otherwise distorting the work of IDO. 
3. Reducing Risk of War. Control over existing armaments 
and armed forces can be as important initially in preserving the peace 
as the destruction of weapons or liql~idation of forces. It constitutes 
a step toward the reduction and eventual elimination of the military 
establishments. 
Under the U.S. plan practical measures are proposed to prevent 
surprise attack, or war through accident, failure of communications, or 
miscalculation. When weapons of terrible destructiveness can be 
triggered on short notice, nations need the protection these measures 
offer, even while they progress toward complete disarmament. 
Such measures, which reflect the importance of the "arms control" 
concept as it has developed in the United States, can be put into effect 
immediately and independent of actual disarmament measures. They 
would include, for example, banning nuclear weapons tests, stopping 
production of fissionable material suitable for nucleaT weapons, and 
organizing U.N. Peace Observation teams to check on possible con-
flict. Their goal would be to initiate a halt in the arms race and 
reduce the dangers of accidental war. Indeed, by increasing mutual 
trust and security, such arms control measures would help to speed 
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agreement on arms reductions and make countries more willing to 
continue the process of disarming once it has begun. 
4. Keeping the Peace. International arrangements for keeping 
the peace and for settling disputes among nations must keep pace 
with measures for slashing arms and armies and reducing the risks of 
war. The U.S. plan provides for the international community to 
develop new and effective instruments for dealing with disputes among 
nations. In particular, the plan proposes to expand and strengthen 
international peacekeeping arrangements through such new instru-
lnents as a U.N. Peace Force, a U.N. Peace Observation Corps, and a 
Code of International Conduct. 
Such peacekeeping arrangements would advance simultaneously 
and proportionately with the dismantling of national military estab-
lishments. As the warmaking power of nations declined, the peace-
making power of the international community grows. 
5. Studies for the Future. The present U.S. plan is the prod-
uct of hundreds of scholars, scientists, and military experts who have 
studied the problem for years. It is more concrete than any disarma-
ment plan ever presented before. Yet it is only a beginning in the 
systematic search for the means necessary to create 'a society without 
war. The international community will have to come to grips with 
such problems as disposing safely of the vast quantities of nuclear 
weapons to be destroyed, converting nuclear material stockpiles to 
peaceful uses, liquidating stockpiles and halting production of chemi-
cal and biological weapons, devising measures to guard against sur-
prise attack or accidental war and improving the n1achinery for peace-
ful settlement of disputes. 
Studying these questions and coming up with appropriate solu-
tions is a vital element in the disarmament process. The U.S. plan 
identifies some of the most important problems and p.roposes the 
machinery so that man's intelligence can be applied to their solution. 
Highlights of the U.S. Disarmament Plan 
The breadth and depth of the U.S. proposal can be gaged by ex-
amining more closely some of the specific measures suggested. 
STAGE I (Estimated time: 3 years) 
1. REDUCING ARMAMENTS 
All types of so-called nuclear delivery vehicles, such as missiles 
and airplanes and other equipment which can deliver nuclear weapons, 
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The B-52-a U.S. long-range bomber. 
The long-range bomber is one type 0/ weapon that the 
u.s. disarmament plan proposed to eliminate by phased 
reductions, starting with a 30 percent reduction in 
Stage 1. 
The Bison-a Soviot long-range bomber. 
as well as major conventional armaments in agreed categories, would 
be slashed by 30 percent. The reductions in this stage would be 10 
percent annually over an estimated 3-year period. 
The purpose is to begin shrinking the overall warmaking capacity 
of nations in the most destructive weapons, without altering the rela-
tive military strength of the participants. Countries would have the 
assurance, essential in this early stage of disarmament, that their mili-
tary position vis-a-vis others remains unimpaired. At the same time 
the process of defusing the world's most destructive powder kegs 
would have begun, and all nations would be safer for it. 
For example: Stage I reduction of the U.S. and Soviet long- and 
medium-range nuclear striking force would mean the destruction or 
the conversion to peaceful uses, under international supervision, of 
30 percent of each type of missile or aircraft in this category. As 
Ambassador Dean explained it at Geneva: 
"The United States would ... have to a.pply this cut to its 
B-52 aircraft, to its Titan missiles, to its Atlas missiles, to its sub-
marine-launched Polaris missiles, and to its Hound Dog missiles, and 
to any other type of delivery vehicle which, by the time the treaty is 
negotiated, came into the category description. . .. 
"The Soviet Union ... would have to apply the 30 percent cut 
to its heavy four-turboprop bomber designed by Tupolev and known 
in the West as the Bear; to its heavy four-jet bomber designed by 
Miasishchev and called in the 'Vest the Bison; to its intercontinental 
missiles fired to the Kamchatka peninsula and into the Pacific; to its 
missiles on submarines; and to its air-to-surface missiles displayed last 
year with the Bear bomber. 
"In the case of the United States Titan and Atlas missiles, as in the 
case of the Soviet missiles in this category, related fixed launching 
pads would be cut, along with the missiles. The same would be true 
with respect to fixed lauching pads related to missiles which would be 
cut in other categories." 
Similar procedures would apply to other agreed categories of 
weapons, and at each successive stage of disarmament. Any arms 
production permitted during Stage I would have to be offset by 
comparable destruction of weapons in the respective categories so that 
the 30 percent net reduction in each category is maintained. 
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2. REDUCING MILITARY FORCES 
The armies of the United States, U.S.S.R., and of other specified 
military powers would be reduced to 2.1 million men each. Other 
countries would reduce their armies to 100,000 men or to one percent 
of their population, whichever is higher, provided this does not result 
in an increase in the size of the particular country's armed forces. 
Thus, for example, a country of 50 million would be allowed a maxi-
mum armed force of 500,000 men, provided its force was at least that 
large at the time it became a party to the treaty. 
Countries would also consult regarding civilian employment by 
military establishments to insure that military forces are not being 
surreptitiously maintained in the guise of civilian employees. 
3. liMITING NUCDEAR WEAPONS 
Production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons would be 
halted immediately and the United States and U.S.S.R. would begin 
to transfer weapons-grade Uranium-235, the essential ingredient of 
nuclear arms, from military to peaceful purposes under interil'ational 
supervision. The United States has suggested that for a start the two 
principal producers of U-235, the United States and the U.S.S.R., each 
transfer 50,000 kilograms of this material. This would immediately 
reduce the atomic materials used in weapons by 100,000 kilograms, 
the equivalent of tens of thousands of megatons of explosive power. 
Additional transfers would follow in Stages II and III. 
The danger that countries without nuclear arms may develop 
nuclear arsenals in the future would be reduced by an agreement not 
to transfer nuclear weapons or weapons production know-how to such 
countries; at the same time signatories to the treaty who do not possess 
nuclear weapons would agree not to acquire or manufacture them. 
Agreement on halting all nuclear weapons tests under effective 
international control, if not achieved earlier, would become part of 
the Stage I measures with respect to nuclear weapons. 
4. CONTROLLING ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE 
Agreement not to place weapons of mass destruction into orbit, 
required in Stage I, would eliminate the danger to mankind which 
might arise if nations were to send artificial satellites equipped with 
nuclear warheads into orbit around the earth. At ~he same time 
countries would support increased international cooperation in peace-
ful outer space activities and would notify IDO and other countries 
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of upcoming space launchings. IDO would have the right to inspect 
space vehicles and missiles before launch and would also monitor 
arrangements for limiting the production, stockpiling, and testing of 
the rocket boosters needed to place space vehicles into outer space. 
5. REDUCING RISK OF WAR 
The danger of surprise attack or accidental war would be reduced 
through a series of measures, including prior notification of military 
movements or maneuvers, establishment of observation posts to report 
on military movements, exchange of military missions, and estab-
lishment of rapid and reliable communications among governments 
and the United Nations. 
An International Commission on Reduction of the Risk of War 
would be established under IDO to work out further measures in this 
area. 
6. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS 
Countries would renounce the threat or use of force in interna-
tional relations, including nuclear, conventional, chemical, or biologi-
cal warfare as well as all forms of indirect aggression or internal 
subversion. A subsidiary body of IDO would seek to develop a Code 
of International Conduct related to disarmament. Countries would 
agree to utilize and further strengthen existing U.N. peacekeeping 
machinery, and to this end plans would be drawn up for a U.N. Peace 
Force capable of insuring international security, to be established 
in Stage II. A permanent U.N. Peace Observation Corps would be 
established to investigate on a moment's notice any breach of peace or 
situations which might lead to such a breach. 
STAGE " (Estimated time: 3 years) 
1. REDUCING ARMAMENTS 
Countries which had participated from the beginning would 
slash their remaining armaments in categories specified in Stage I 
in half, bringing them down to 35 percent of pretreaty levels. New 
parties to the treaty would reduce armament in these categories by 
65 percent to match the reductions made by the original participants in 
Stages I and II. 
Additional categories of arms not included in Stage I would be 
included and reduced by 50 percent during Stage II. This cut would 
apply to smaller types of military aircraft, missiles, ships, and other 
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specified military equipment, as well as t.o auxiliary-type planes .or 
ships, thus further reducing the .overall war PQtential .of natiQns. 
M.ore.over, .on the basis .of studies previously undertaken, coun· 
tries WQuld prQceed tQ reduce and eventually eliminate chemical 
and biQlQgical weapQns .of mass destructiQn. All prQductiQn and 
testing .of such weapQns WQuld cease, plants WQuld be cQnverted tQ 
peaceful uses, and cQuntries WQuld slash their stQckpiles .of such 
weapQns by 50 percent. 
There are reasQns-PQlitical, eCQnQmic, and technical-fQr prQ-
ceeding in this graduated fashiQn. The kind .of prQcess the United 
States prQPQses is unprecedented in histQry. It WQuld transform PQ-
litical relatiQns 'amQng natiQns, shift the emplQyment .of vast eCQnomic 
and scientific reSQurces within cQuntries, and virtually liquidate .one .of 
the .oldest institutiQns .of sQciety-the military establishment. FQr 
such a mQnumental task t.o be cQmpleted, there must be the pr.oper psy-
ch.ological and political climate; new machinery fQr reducing and veri-
fying the reductiQn .of arms -and arms production must be established 
and perfected; and measures must be taken, as indicated earlier, tQ 
allQw for retraining manpower and redirecting reSQurces previQusly 
emplQyed by the military establishment. The three-stage apprQach, 
allQwing an estimated 6 years fQr the first two stages, WQuld actually 
guarantee a very fast, but realistically feasible, pace .of disarmament, 
cQnsidering the great c.omplexity .of the prQcess. 
2. REDUCING MILITARY FORCES 
Stage I fQrce levels fQr the United States and U.S.S.R. WQuld be 
reduced tQ 1.05 million men. Other countries' armies W.ould also 
be reduced frQm Stage I levels, and in nQ case could they exceed 
the agreed level .of 1.05 milliQn men each for ,the United States and 
U.S.S.R. -
3. LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
Countries WQuld reduce their remaining nuclear weapQns by 
agreed percentages tQ minimum levels. These reductiQns WQuld be 
based .on ,studies to determine the best means for reducing and eventu-
ally eliminating nuclear weap.ons stockpiles. Such studies are essential 
if the elimination .of nuclear weapons is tQ proceed safely and 
effectively. 
During the last 6 mQnths .of Stage II, all nuclear weapQns in the 
PQssessiQn .of natiQns WQuld be registered with IDa, tQ insure CQm-
plete eliminatiQn frQm national stockpiles in Stage III. 
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4. DISMANTLING MILITARY BASES AND FACILITIES 
Countries would dismantle or convert to peaceful uses agreed 
military bases and facilities. The liquidation would proceed in an 
agreed sequence and would be verified by IDO. Under this pro,-
vision the United States and U.S.S.R., for example, would liquidate 
bases outside as well as within their territories, since both contribute 
to the warmaking capacity of the two countries. 
5. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS 
In preparation for Stage III, international peacekeeping activi-
ties would be greatly expanded. Countries would agree on addi-
tional steps to assure peaceful settlement of disputes and codification 
of rules of international conduct related to disarmament. These 
~teps would be based in part on prior studies. Participants would 
also accept compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice to settle international legal disputes. 
The U.N. Peace Observation Corps established earlier would be 
further expanded, and a U.N. Peace Force, equipped to deal with 
breaches of the peace, would be established. Countries which had 
not yet done so would enact national laws in support of the treaty. 
The adoption of all these measures would profoundly alter the 
present complexion of international relations. National military 
strength would recede into the background as a factor in settling dis-
putes among nations, making way for a growing body of international 
law and other peaceful machinery. The world would be ready for 
the process of complete disarmament indicated in Stage III. 
STAGE III (Estimated time: to be agreed) 
1. ELIMINATING ARMAMENTS, ARMED ·FORCES, AND MILI-
TARY BASES OR FACILITIES 
Countries would dispose of all remaining armaments, military 
forces, and bases or facilities, except for those needed to maintain 
internal order and the personal security of citizens. Arms produc-
tion would cease except for limited amounts needed to maintain the 
permissible national forces or to supply the U.N. Peace Force. All 
nuclear weapons still retained in national arsenals at the conclusion 
of Stage II would be eliminated, and nuclear weapons production 
facilities and materials would be converted to peaceful purposes. 
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2. REPORTING RESEARCH OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE 
While the nations proceed in the total dismantling of their mili-
tary establishments, the international community would have to take 
on added responsibilities to see that new scientific discoveries do not 
reverse the process of universal disarmament so carefully achieved. 
To accomplish this, treaty members would report to IDO any basic 
scientific discovery or technological invention of potential military 
significance; IDO, in turn, would examine such discoveries or inven-
tions and recommend appropriate measures for their control. 
3. STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING ARRANGEMENTS 
Countries would support and provide agreed manpower for the 
U.N. Peace Force, which would be progressively strengthened to a 
point where no state could challenge it. Arrangements for peaceful 
settlement of disputes, reducing risks of war, and codification of rules 
of international conduct related to disarmament, begun in Stages I 
and II, would be continued. Additional measures would be adopted 
as necessary to make possible peaceful change in a disarmed world. 
Verifying Disarmament Progress 
The United States proposes the establishment of an International 
Disarmament Organization (IDO) within the framework of the 
United Nations to verify that agreed disarmament measures are in 
fact being carried out. The proposed functions and procedures of 
this all-important body have been developed in accordance with the 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement of Principles, especially the principle 
that disarmament should proceed "from beginning to end" under 
'~strict and effective international control . . . [to] provide firm 
assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations . . ., the 
nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for 
verification ... in each stage." 
The extent of verification is directly related to the amount and 
type of disarmament measure undertaken and the degree of risk 
involved in possible violations. Questions naturally arise about the 
way this principle would apply in practice-how much authority it 
would give the international body and whether it would lead to un-
necessary "snooping" into the affairs of individual nations. These 
questions can best be answered by specific illustrations. 
Stage I, of the U.S. plan, for example, provides, among other 
things, for transferring specified stockpiles of Uranium-235-the es-
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sential component of nuclear weapons-to purposes other than weap-
ons. In this instance all IDO would do would be to verify that the 
particular quantities were in fact transferred; it would not be au-
thorized to look at a country's remaining stockpiles of Uranium-235, 
since these have no relation to the particular disarmament measure 
being undertaken. 
On the other hand, in order to verify that a country has indeed 
reduced certain major armaments by 30 percent, as provided in Stage 
I, IDO would have to verify not only the reduction itself but also the 
level of armament being retained. If only the reduction were super-
vised, there would be no assurance to other participating countries 
that it really represents a 30 percent cut and that new production will 
not replace those weapons which have been destroyed. 
For example, if a country allowed IDO to supervise only the 
destruction of 1,000 bombers, claiming that this represented 30 percent 
of its bomber force, what real assurance would other countries have 
that the 1,000 bombers destroyed really represented 30 percent of the 
total force? How would they know that these were not simply 1,000 
obsolete models w hi'ch had been replaced by better models from new 
production? Obviously such assurance can only be obtained through 
IDO verification of the destruction of the bombers, cOlnbined with 
inspection of the remaining bomber force. 
In an effort to limit verification to the minimum consistent with 
the security of the disarming nations, the United States suggests a 
system of progressive zonal inspection. The system would apply to 
those disarmament measures, such as arms or armed forces reduction, 
which can be verified by applying advanced statistical sampling and 
auditing techniques; others, however, such as stopping production of 
fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, could not be verified in this 
manner and would require separate procedures. 
Under a system of progressive zonal inspection, each country 
would divide its territory into an agreed number of zones and declare 
to IDO the types but not the geographical location of armaments, 
forces, or facilities in each zone which would be subject to verification. 
When the first 10 percent reduction of armaInents takes effect, 
for example, as provided for in the first year of Stage I, a zone or 
zones would be selected in each country. The exact geographical 
location of armaments, forces, and facilities would then be revealed in 
the zone or zones selected, and inspection would proceed. With the 
next 10 percent reduction, additional zones would be opened, and so 
on, until at the end of the disarmament process the ent ire territory of 
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a country would be open to verification. Countries would have no 
advance notice which of their zones would be selected for verification, 
and there would be safeguards against illegal transfers between zones. 
Thus there would be reasonable assurance against clandestine activi-
ties, and yet the extent of verification would closely correspond to the 
extent of disarmament undertaken. 
The zonal inspection system, of course, would apply to all parties 
to the treaty, so that at any particular time the same proportion of the 
territory of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and of other countries 
would be open to international verification. 
Conclusion 
The U.S. plan described in this pamphlet represents a realistic 
attempt to bring about general and complete disarmament in a peace-
ful world. 
It provides for the simultaneous development of peacekeeping ma-
chinery and the destruction or conversion of the warmaking capacity 
of nations to peaceful purposes. It outlines reasonable procedures 
for verification, which would apply equally to all participating coun-
tries and would be in proportion to the amount of disarmament under-
taken. Lastly, it provides for an immediate halt to the arms race, a 
freeze in the warmaking capacities of nations, and effective procedures 
for dismantling these capacities until they no longer exist. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote 17 years ago, just before 
his death: 
"Today, as we move forward against the terrible scourge of war-
as we go forward toward the greatest contribution that any generation 
of human beings can make in this world-the contribution of lasting 
peace-I ask you to keep up your faith .... The only limit to our 
realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today .... " 
These words still apply. The United States believes the time is 
ripe for reaching agreement on disarman1ent. It will continue to 
work for such agreement in the conviction that man's creative genius 
is capable of realizing man's dream of a world without war. 
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